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行為の理由についての研究ノート : よきサマリア人の譬えから哲学的分析へ
https://ic.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/543
https://ic.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/5436621cd7a-e203-4e5b-9f22-6693eb4f0bdc
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
KJ00004297782.pdf (1.3 MB)
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| Item type | [ELS]紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||||||||
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| 公開日 | 2017-03-15 | |||||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||||
| タイトル | 行為の理由についての研究ノート : よきサマリア人の譬えから哲学的分析へ | |||||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||||
| タイトル | A Note on the Reasons to Do Action | |||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||||||
| 言語 | jpn | |||||||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||||||||
| 資源タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||||||||
| 雑誌書誌ID | ||||||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||||||||
| 収録物識別子 | AN10587446 | |||||||||||
| 著者 |
銭谷, 秋生
× 銭谷, 秋生
× Zeniya, Akio
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| 抄録(英) | ||||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||||
| 内容記述 | In "Internal and external reasons" Bernard Williams argues that there are two kinds of reason claims to act, or two ways of making reason claims to act. Supose I say that some person P has a reason to do action A. If I intend this to imply that person P has a motive to do action A, the claim is of an internal reason; if not, the claim is of am external reason. Williams is of the opinion that only internal reasons really exist, because the reasons, which can motivate an agent to do action, can get their forces only from the agent's subjective motivational set. If this is true, it looks as if all practical reasons to act would be relative to the individual, becouse they are all conditioned by what is in the subjective motivational set. An agent can't acquire any motivation which does not come from their personal history, that is, any motivation which can be valid for every rational human being. Against the view about motivational force of reasons expunded by Williams, Korsgaard argues that there can be external reasons to act, which impose certain form of action on agents regardless of their subjective motibational set. These reasons to act can, according to Korsgard, dome from pure practical reasoning. One can not asuume that the subjectivemoticational set consisits only of individual or idiosyncratic elements. Assuming so is to close off without argument the possibility of us being motivated by the reasons that every rational being must acknowledge and be capable of being motivated by. This article surveys and examinse the arguguments by Williams and Korsgaard's criticism of them. The main problem considered is this: can one acpuire motivations that the history and culture in which one has been brought up and lives do not usually supply? Or can our practical reason by itself motivate us independently of our habitual desires and beliefs? | |||||||||||
| 書誌情報 |
茨城キリスト教大学紀要. I, 人文科学 en : Journal of Ibaraki Christian University. I, Humanities 巻 38, p. 158-143, 発行日 2004-12-25 |
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| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||||
| 内容記述 | 7 | |||||||||||
| アクセション番号 | ||||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||||
| 内容記述 | KJ00004297782 | |||||||||||
| ISSN | ||||||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||||||||
| 収録物識別子 | 13426362 | |||||||||||
